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Beijing’s military adventurism in the Himalayas is risky

While the involvement in North Sikkim was resolved on the basis of mutually agreed protocols, those in East Ladakh remained, which led to speculation about China’s intentions.

The last big fight between the Asian giants took place in Doklam in 2017 and lasted 73 days. There followed informal meetings between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, first in Wuhan in April 2018 and then in Mamallapuram in Tamil Nadu in October 2019. During these interactions, both heads of state and government reaffirmed the importance of peace in border areas for greater strategic gains. They also gave instructions to their respective military officers to exercise restraint and mutual understanding and trust.

Both military officers were cautious on a strategic and operational level. At the tactical level, however, encounters arise due to different perceptions of where the actual boundary is, since the LAC is not delimited on site. While allusions are resolved on site, the problems associated with building infrastructure such as roads and defenses are invariably longer and require a combination of military and diplomatic initiatives.

The bilateral agreements signed between 1
993 and 2013 have helped prevent the use of violence beyond occasional fistfights. No bullet has been fired from either side since 1975, and that is unlikely to change now.

China can hardly afford any risky adventurism in the Himalayas, given the myriad of internal and external challenges during the coronavirus pandemic. A conflict with India, its key regional strategic competitor, will not only exacerbate its problems, but will also seriously hamper its stated path to global superpower by 2050. The challenges facing Xi Jinping today include China’s shrinking economy, its newly sparked trade war with the United States, the exit of some manufacturing companies, and the slowdown in its ambitious Belt and Road initiative. The protests in Hong Kong, Taiwan’s intransigence, and the global demand to investigate its role in the coronavirus pandemic have also added to its concerns.

Apart from Pakistan, which is its strategic all-weather partner in the region, Beijing’s assertive behavior combined with its alleged role in pandemics in Asian countries, where it became friendly as part of its containment strategy against India, has become anti-Chinese Mood led. India would do well to use this to its advantage.

Mutual deterrence

China is aware of the current combat potential of the Indian military and has seen that since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 across the still controversial Himalayan border, it has developed into an accountable, responsive and powerful element of national power. Both military have been training together for many years to improve interoperability for humanitarian aid, disaster relief and counter-terrorism. Understanding each other’s military capabilities contributes to deterrence as each side realizes the dire consequences of a conflict. India has shown, under current political leadership, its propensity to use violence when provoked. The volatile and complex proxy war arena of Jammu and Kashmir has continued to help the Indian army put its soldiers to the test.

Chinese and Indian soldiers are engaged in & # 39; aggressive & # 39; cross-border battle
The possibility that Beijing may use the allusions for strategic news to India cannot be ruled out. New Delhi has not only joined the international choir to investigate the emergence and spread of the coronavirus pandemic, but has also blocked the automatic path for approving foreign direct investment from China. Strengthening the strategic partnership between India and the United States is another irritant for Beijing. China is known to use incentives and intimidation to deal with external and internal challenges, and arouses nationalist passion to overshadow various governance-related mistakes and shortcomings. The running LAC lines serve both purposes. Unlike the previous encounters, the Chinese mainstream and social media were extremely active this time in spreading patriotic stories.
The reconciliation statements by the Chinese embassy in New Delhi and the Federal Foreign Office in Beijing point to China’s desire to defuse the border tensions. However, there was no forward movement on the ground. With India determined to develop border infrastructure on its territory, early resolution of the implications could be difficult. This is a bilateral matter with no scope for third-party intervention: both India and China have rejected the US mediation proposal.

Although conflict is a distant possibility in the near future, India needs to seriously develop its anti-aggression military capabilities and, if that fails, fight to win wars for the country. It is certainly not a good idea to rely on external powers to wage India’s wars. As an emerging great power, India has to carry its own large stick.

For greater economic and geo-strategic gains, a peaceful solution is the answer. There is enough space in the world for the two Asian giants to grow at the same time.

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