The press accused the aircraft and many passengers were afraid to fly. The jet should bring the company on a path of success, because the mode of transport was required by airlines. If the panic persists and the airlines are unwilling to buy them, the future of Boeing would be in danger.
However, the crisis described above was far worse than the Boeing 737 Max's, and it happened more than 50 years ago.
In a four-month period in late 1965 and early 1966, four new Boeing 727 jets crashed. Three of the crashes occurred when the planes landed at American airports. Two of them occurred in November 1965 within three days.
The lessons of this earlier crisis
Obviously, Boeing's crisis survived from the mid-1
First, the right training for pilots who fly new aircraft is crucial.
The pilots were not ready to fly the 727, which led to the crashes.
But the crashes of 1965 and & # 39; 66 showed that passengers can overcome their fear of certain jets fairly quickly if Boeing can prove they're safe.
If the story is a guide, the nervousness about the 737 Max should be withdrawn.
These four crashes of 727 left the traveling public uneasy. Air crashes were much more common then and many more people had little experience with air travel.
The 727 had three Jet engines at the stern, the first airliner with less than four engines. This made him more economical than the four-engine Boeing 707 (19659002), the industry's first commercial jet. The 727 also had innovative wings that slowed the plane faster and landed on shorter runways. This allowed the aircraft to land at airports previously served only by propellers, an important selling point.
But the pilots at the controls of the four convicted jets were apparently unprepared for how fast the planes would descend with the new wings.
One of the planes that flew to O & # 39; Hare Airport in Chicago plunged miles into Lake Michigan.
"Newspaper headlines called it" Deadly 727. "There have been many calls to justify it," said Bill Waldock, a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and head of the school's crash lab. "There were travel agencies that carried passengers off the plane, it could have killed the plane."
The FAA Remains at Boeing
As was the case last week when aviation authorities were around the world After the third deadly crash of 727, the Boeing FAA was held by Boeing in 1965. She said she could not find a pattern in the crashes. It declined to ground the jet.
Finally, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the National Transportation Safety Board, the successor to the CAB created after the crashes, broke the 727 and blamed the pilot for the accident.
"The Board notes that the probable cause of this accident was that the captain did not take timely action to prevent an excessive sink rate during approach," investigators said, investigating a Salt Lake City crash.
The Need for More Training
The pilots were not properly prepared to deal with the changes in handling the aircraft compared to the commercial jets operating in front of them.
"The sink rates that could develop were far, far more than what they were used to," said Shem Malmquist, an accident investigator and guest professor at the Florida Institute of Technology. He is a Boeing 777 captain who has previously flown the 727. "Investigators were right that the plane itself was safe, they ruled out the pilots were not trained for it."
But Boeing arrived at the Crisis of 727 over. Increased training resulted in safer aircraft operation, and these crashes ended.
"The problem was the training and experience of the pilot," said Waldock, who teaches the 727 crashes as part of his accident investigation courses. "The training was expanded as a result of the accidents."
Public acceptance of once troubled aircraft
The 727 became the best-selling aircraft of its time for Boeing. It eventually sold 1,831 of the jets, nearly twice as many as the DC-9 rival.
DC-9 maker Douglas Aircraft teamed up with McDonnell Aircraft a few years later. Boeing eventually bought the merged company McDonnell Douglas in 1997.
Public concern over crashed aircraft is generally short-lived, said aviation writer and historian Brian Baum.
"People were pretty nervous about the battery issues," Baum said. "But I do not know anyone who would have a problem with the 787 today."
All in all, consumers decide on the costs.
"I do not know people will take care of them for a long time," Malmquist said. "They only care about the price of the ticket."