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China could win a war against America in the South China Sea



<p class = "Canvas Atom Canvas Text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " James Holmes " data- reactid = "11"> James Holmes

<p class = "Canvas Atom Canvas Text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " Security, Asia " data-reactid = "12"> Security, Asia

Here is the PLAN.

China could win a war against America in the South China Sea

<p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text Accordingly, US and Allied sailors and aviators must study the Chinese war traditions and gain insights into how offshore active defense could develop in the South China Sea. "If you are Beijing and have built a naval militia, an impressive Coast Guard, Asia's largest indigenous navy, and a large arsenal of land weapons to influence events at sea, how do you assemble these components into a fierce fighting device – and consolidate control of a semi-enclosed sea? "data-reactid = "24"> The US and Allied sailors and airmen must accordingly study China's battle traditions and gain insights into how offshore active V defense in the South China Sea. If you're in Beijing building a maritime militia, an impressive Coast Guard, Asia's largest indigenous navy, and a large arsenal of land weapons to influence the events at sea, how do you turn these components into a powerful weapon and control? Consolidate semi-closed sea?

<p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = "China's Secretary of Defense, General Chang Wanquan pleaded with the nation last year to prepare for a "People's War at Sea . "The Purpose of Such a Campaign" Sovereignty "after a Disapproving Decision of the International Maritime Tribunal . The Tribunal affirmed the clear meaning of the [UN-Übereinkommens über den Schutz der Menschenrechte in der Welt] that Beijing claims to " indisputable sovereignty ," which is 80-90 percent of the South China Sea's berth. "data-reactid =" 25 "> China's Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan pleaded with the nation last year to prepare for a" People's War at Sea . "The purpose of such a campaign?" Preserve sovereignty The Court upheld the clear meaning of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) according to which Beijing's claims to " indisputable sovereignty extending over 80 -90 percent of the South China Sea are bunk.

<p class = "Canvas Atom Canvas Text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" Type = " Text "content =" A strong coastal state can not simply demolish and assimilate the high seas or waters that are assigned to weaker neighbors . "data-reactid =" 26 "> In other words, a strong coastal state can not easily demolish and conquer the offshore or waters allotted to the weaker neighbors .

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Or at least He may not do so lawfully, as this could possibly be due to conquests later enforced by a permanent military presence, and seafarers' defenders must therefore honor General Chang's requests foresee in abundance in the South China Sea.

This is the first point about one People's war at sea. A collision of the arms is possible. Statesmen and commanders in places like Manila, Hanoi, and Washington should not dismiss Chang's words as a mere tumult.

In fact, it is doubtful whether China could comply with the ruling of the UNCLOS tribunal at that time, even if the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party wished. Think about the image compatibility projected at home. For two decades, Beijing has been generously investing in a large navy and supporting this Marine Coastal Force in the form of fighter jets, anti-ship rocket batteries, and short-range warships such as fast patrol boats and diesel submarines.

<p class = "Canvas Atom Canvas Text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" (This first appeared last year.) "data-reactid =" 33 " (This first appeared last year.)

Party leaders have shown the people how they will deploy naval forces to correct the story's wrongs and gain the nautical reputation of the country. You have to follow now.

<p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " (This first appeared in the year 2016.) "data-reactid =" 35 "> (This first appeared in 2016.)

<p class =" canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0 em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" It was foolish to tie China's national dignity and sovereignty to apparently absurd claims on islands and seas But the party leaders did that they did it repeatedly, publicly, and in the most implacable words imaginable, using their words to fuel the nationalist sentiment while making themselves accountable to themselves, setting in motion a noxious cycle of rising popular expectations. "data-reactid = It was foolish to blame China's national dignity and sovereignty for apparently absurd claims on islands and seas inden . But party leaders have done it. And they did it repeatedly, publicly and in the most impossible terms. With their words, they fueled the nationalist sentiment and made themselves responsible. They start a toxic cycle of rising expectations of the population.

<p class = "Canvas Atom Canvas Text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "Text" content = "If you distract Beijing from its maritime demands, the normal Chinese would rightly judge by the standard he has set.The party leaders would be condemned as weaklings who have given up the sacred territory, failed the China century of humiliation despite China's rise to power to avenge lawyers and lesser neighbors by a certain superpower great, evil will of China . "data-reactid =" 37 "> Breaking this cycle could be impossible. If Beijing now slipped off its maritime demands, the ordinary Chinese would judge the leadership correctly, according to the standard he had set. Party leaders would be despised as weaklings who, in spite of China's rise to power, did not avenge the humiliation of and supported lawyers and weaker neighbors by a certain superpower great, evil will of China .

<p class = "Canvas Atom Canvas Text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "Text" content = "No leader enjoys being seen as a weakling. In China, it's downright dangerous. As the great ones of diplomacy teach, it is difficult for negotiators or political leaders to break public obligations, and you bind yourself to keep it, failing to keep it, and you discredit yourself – and catastrophic disaster. "data-reactid =" 38 "> No leader enjoys being seen as a weakling. It is absolutely dangerous in China. As the great ones teach diplomacy it is difficult for negotiators or political leaders to abandon public commitments. Promise and bond to keep it. You can not hold it, and you discredit yourself – and bring a disaster into play.

Like any sensible leadership, Beijing prefers to prevail without fighting. However, fighting could be the worst of the options the party leaders have left themselves. Pretty much the predicament they have made for themselves.

<p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = "Which leads to the second point, in Chang's words The small-stick diplomacy has subsided.The small-stick diplomacy was about to send the China Coast Guard and other non-military marine services into the police waters of Beijing, claiming China's sovereignty in the South China Sea as one Fact and wistfully outnumbered rivals dared to reverse that fact. "Data-reactid =" 42 "> Which leads to the second point. In Chang's words the small-stick diplomacy has expired. Small-stick diplomacy was about deploying the Chinese Coast Guard and other non-military naval services in the waters of the police that claimed Beijing. It presented the sovereignty of China in the South China Sea as a fact and dared to surpass its rivals in order to reverse that fact.

<p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = "Left, de facto Chinese sovereignty – a Near-Monopoly of Power within the limits outlined on the map – would have solidified Over time, it became, as soon as it became the new normal state, even a certain legitimacy among mariners. "Data-reactid =" 43 "> Unchallenged de facto Chinese sovereignty – a monopoly on force within the outlined boundaries on the map – would have solidified over time. Once it became the new normal, it might even have gained an aura of legitimacy among sailors.

The UNCLOS tribunal made a severe blow to China's approach, breaking down the quasi-legal arguments of small-stick diplomacy. The Tribunal's ruling makes it clear that the Chinese naval forces operating in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines are invaders or occupiers and not constables.

If Beijing can not find its way through whitewashed coast guards, military force leaves behind. Sovereign states use lawful assets to control what they are entitled to. They use military forces to fight for contentious issues. Chang's warlike conversation implies that Beijing has abandoned its quiet, gentle approach and tacitly admitted that Southeast Asia is a contested zone.

And the jargon he employs is important. The People's War is a Maoist phrase that conveys certain warlike ideas. Mao Zedong's Red Army led the People's War to conquer Japanese opponents and Chinese nationalists clashed ground. It looks like China is seeing the South China Sea in a similar way – as an offshore battlefield where rivals have to be overpowered by force.

But not only by military force. Beijing will not withdraw the Coast Guard, the maritime enforcement services or the fishing fleet – an unofficial militia – from the contested waters. They will continue as part of a composite state armada. But the People's Liberation Army (PLA) navy and air force will play a bigger role in the force mix.

In the days of small bar diplomacy, the large naval staff was an implicit threat beyond the horizon. Filipino or Vietnamese sailors knew that the China Coast Guard had support if they defied it. In all likelihood, the Chinese commanders will in future develop the big stick even more promiscious – making the threat open and visible rather than latent and inconspicuous.

Here is the third point. A People's War on Sea strategy will confront a colorful coalition in which outsiders – America, perhaps Japan or Australia – provide the bulk of the powerful combat capability. The Philippines are unilaterally inferior. Vietnam has a strong military, but it can barely withstand the northern colossus without help.

<p class = "canvas atom canvas text mb (1.0em) mb (0) – sm mt (0.8 em) – sm" type = "text" content = "The curious composition of the coalition would give Beijing opportunity to China might argue that any conflict in the South China Sea would be a " war by contingent ]" For the United States, a war in which Washington sets the size of a force in support of regional allies and instruct the commanders of this force to do their best with the means at their disposal. " data-reactid = "50"> The strange make-up of the coalition would give Beijing the chance to break coalition. China might think that any conflict in the South China Sea would be a "war for contingent " for the United States, in which Washington determines the size of a force to support regional ally forces and instructs the commanders of that force to use the means to that they have to do the best they can.

Such strategies are excellent for problem-making, but rarely decisive for themselves. Lord Wellington, for example, led a contingent of land in 1807 in Iberia. The expedition gave Napoleon a "Spanish ulcer," a nagging commitment to a new front. But Wellington never made fun of himself for winning a continent-wide war with a modest expeditionary force, reinforced by partisans and the Royal Navy.

Such an approach would betray Washington's halfheartedness. After all, America would have opened an open business in a distant theater off the coasts of the enemy without a real idea of ​​victory. Halfheartedness kills in such undertakings.

The People's War is about surviving stronger enemies under such circumstances. If the weaker candidate is a China equipped with considerable reserves of hard power to type, then this candidate needs time. Their forces extend the campaign to gain time, to gather more strength and to get rid of the enemy's fighting power.

In short, China could win, even if it remains weaker overall than America. The PLA could limit or reverse the balance of theater forces and overwhelm US contingents in the place and time that are really important. It could discourage Washington. US leaders may despair of maintaining the company indefinitely. Or China could outlive America, which would lead to many tactical losses for a long time, raising the price of maintaining the freedom of the seas as US leaders are ready to pay. When America goes home, the venture collapses.

How can PLA commanders bring this about operationally and tactically? By cultivating their own warm traditions. China is politically and strategically predictable in the South China Sea, but operationally and tactically unpredictable. Politically and strategically predictable as party leaders painted themselves in a corner with domestic constituencies. Tactically unpredictable because the Chinese forces have been fighting each other since the Mao era.

<p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm". In fact, "active defense," the concept by which Mao codified his ideas about the war of humans remains at the heart of China 's military strategy. Just Ask Beijing Active defense is that a weaker China can make a stronger pugilist over-strain and tire before delivering a punitive counter-attack. Summon in your mind the great Muhammad Ali Rumble in the Jungle and you get the idea. data-reactid = "56"> In fact, "active defense," the concept by which Mao codifies his ideas about the war of humans, remains the heart of Chinese military strategy. Just ask Beijing . To simplify, the fantasy behind active defense is that a weaker China can make a stronger pugilist overextend and tire before delivering a punitive counterattack. Summon in your mind the great Muhammad Ali Rumble in the Jungle and you get the idea.

When the rope-on-dope approach works on a grand scale, Chinese forces can cause tactical defeats that weaken the enemy over time. Active defense is about using tactical attack material for strategically defensive campaigns.

To track it, Chinese commanders seek isolated enemy units that can attack and "circle" and crush them. The cumulative effect of repeated tactical setbacks wears out the strong – and could lead their leadership to wonder if the venture is still worth its hardships, dangers and cost. If not, the cost-benefit logic will push US leaders to the exit – and China will prevail without a direct victory over the Allied forces.

U.S. and Allied sailors and aviators must accordingly study China's combat traditions and gain insights into how offshore active defense could unfold in the South China Sea. If you're in Beijing building a maritime militia, an impressive Coast Guard, Asia's largest indigenous navy, and a large arsenal of land weapons to influence the events at sea, how do you alloy these components into a powerful weapon and strengthen control? a half-closed sea?

Gaining some foresight on these issues could now pay off if China tries to put into practice the strategic concept of General Chang and Mao.

Speaking of which, one last piece of advice from Mao Zedong. Chang used China's traditional lexicon, which focused on the People's War, to describe how Beijing could do business in Southeast Asia. But remember, a weak strategy was useful to Mao, not his strategic preference. He wrote for a China that lay flat on its back and was plagued by civil war and foreign invasions.

It could hardly do anything else. But the goal of active defense – the People's War – was to make the Red Army a stronger opponent. Once Maoist forces reversed the power imbalance, they wanted to unleash a counter-offensive and win on the conventional battlefield.

This is not Mao's China. It is already a beefy economic and military power and would fight on its own ground. Today's PLA enjoys far more offensive options than Mao's Red Army. Instead of returning to a pure people's war against the Maoist pattern, PLA commanders could pursue a mix of small and large units against the US-led coalition.

The People's War could look like a conventional naval war if Beijing believes that military balance and trendlines favor China.

Take a closer look at China's warfare and try to see what we can know about Chinese warming habits and reflexes. But these are not machines that portray Maoist typefaces from the 1930s and 1940s. How they could translate the Maoist doctrine into the offshore arena – and how a recalcitrant coalition can handle such a challenge – is the question of friends of maritime freedom.

<p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " James Holmes JC Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at Naval War College and co-author of Red Star over the Pacific (second edition will be published this October) The views expressed here are his alone. "data-reactid =" 66 James Holmes is JC Wylie's Chair of Maritime Strategy at Naval War College and co-author of Red Star over the Pacific (second edition appears in October) .The views expressed here are his alone. [19659005] <p class = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " https://www.flickr. com / photos / navalsurfaceforces / 30239787651 / sizes / o / Image: Creative Commons. "daten-reactid =" 67 "> https: //www.flickr.com/photos/navalsurfaceforces/30239787651/sizes/o/Image: Creative Commons.

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