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Summary of the "March of Return"



A Palestinian rioter at the Israeli-Gaza border, May 14, 2018. Photo: Reuters / Ibrahim Abu Mustafa

Hamas has not achieved its goals when it commits the "March of Return" campaign. The organization would be wise to make a deal with Gaza directors and the bureaucracy to administer the Gaza Strip while Hamas continues to control it, provided that Israel stops fighting Israel. Perhaps Gaza could begin by paving the way for Singapore's vision.

It is now time for the hundreds in Hamas, whose job it is to create and spread violence against Israel, and the hundreds of Israelis in the political and security establishment are to avoid this violence or to suppress, to evaluate the results of the "march of the return" campaign, at least until the next, which probably begins after a temporary break during the fast month of Ramadan.

The results are strong against Hamas, which has spent a lot of blood and treasures on the campaign.

The organization's biggest failure was its inability to seize Jerusalem's Arab residents and the Palestinian Authority. Hamas is aware that the evocative power of the Palestinian problem (ironically) lies in the names and locations of the Jewish and Christian scriptures ̵

1; Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron – not Gaza, Khan Yunis or Rafah.

19659007] May 28, 2018 7:14 pm

Israel's Invisible Enemies

Radical sub-state actors are able to fully control the territories they control, but they are almost invisible …

The desperation of Hamas, six weeks from the beginning of the campaign at the end of March to Nakba Day on May 15, was relatively calm in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The evidence of the passivity of this population is as varied as it is conclusive.

First, there were no major terrorist attacks in Israel or the West Bank that could end in death. In the four months leading up to the campaign, there were 15 murders.

The scorecard of major attacks that ended with assault or significant material loss leads to the same results – two per month on average over the three months prior to the campaign, compared to one attack in the six weeks of the campaign

Number of messages referring to confrontations between the Palestinian youth and the Israeli army shows the same picture. A large media site, al-Quds archives all the news to "Confrontations" ( muwajahat in Arabic). In the three weeks leading up to the campaign, there were 17 such articles. He slipped to eight in the first three weeks of the election campaign and dropped back to five in the last 24 days.

The headline in al-Quds on the second Friday in the campaign summed up this point: "Gaza is preparing for demonstrations this Friday." In other words, Gaza was preparing – not for the West Bank.

Rather than reinstate unity between Gaza and West Bank residents in the first and second intifada Both areas participated in the violence, and the Return March campaign deepened the split between the two communities since the Hamas takeover in 2007 The gap is not only within the Palestinian political elite, but also at the popular level.

This gap is a great blessing for Israel. Violence is much easier to control if it takes place either at the front of Gaza or at the West Bank, rather than on both fronts, as was the case in the past.

One of the main objectives of the weaker side in a conflict (as Hamas is clearly compared to Israel) is to elicit political division within the stronger side. This is the famous lesson of the Franco-Algerian struggle, in which the FLN and its army were defeated militarily, but they succeeded in creating deep trenches within the French public. This division of the population ended with a complete political victory for the FLN.

The Palestinians did in the first intifada when the Israeli public was sharply divided between left and right. This split facilitated the Oslo process, the founding of the PA, and the move of the PLO leadership to the West Bank.

In contrast, a march focused on the 1949 ceasefire lines, which demanded the return of refugees to Ashkelon (Majdal). Beersheva and Jaffa clearly had the opposite effect on the Israeli public. Instead of being divided, the Israelis gathered behind the IDF's strict zero tolerance policy to break the fence.

Hamas could also have upset its own hardcore elements. According to its own estimates, the campaign cost the organization $ 10 million. Over the past four years, Hamas has paid its 50,000 employees only 40% of its salaries, about $ 500 a month. This hardcore group will likely question Hamas' decision to spend a lot of money on the "return" campaign instead of distributing that money to those employees and their beleaguered families.

Fallout from the violence in the population is also likely. If the number of casualties is nearly right (the numbers are likely to be exaggerated), the vast majority of Gazans – most of whom are not even near the fence – are likely to question such bloodshed if they have exactly the same fence and the same threat have the same reality that existed before the campaign. Those who participated might have a second opinion about their victims, who did not change anything at all.

The headlines in the US, Britain and Europe criticized Israel, the stale condemnations from the depths of the UN and various foreign ministries, and the insults of the Turkish president were small consolations for a troubled Hamas.

The campaign was clearly a failure and this could be the beginning of a welcome change. Hamas could be reason enough to enter into a deal with Gaza chief executives and the bureaucracy to administer Gaza.

Gaza's attributes, including a strong workforce, access to the sea, and proximity to Europe are tremendous benefits that can be harnessed once common sense prevails over fanaticism. Perhaps Gaza can begin to pave the way to a Middle Eastern Singapore and transform the concerns of population density into significant economic, cultural and environmental benefits.

Professor Hillel Frisch is Professor of Politics and Politics Middle East Studies at Bar Ilan University and Senior Researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. This is an edited version of an article that first appeared in The Jerusalem Post on May 24, 2018. BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Ross dealer family.

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