Already in March 201
The National Transportation Safety Board released its report on the accident this week, and my friends, it's scary. The pilot of the aircraft, a man named Mark Radloff, decided to abandon the launch after had reached the aircraft "V1", a speed determined by a conditional equation and described as "The top speed at takeoff to initiate a rejected launch to ensure that a safe stop on the remaining runway can be completed. " In fact, his decision was a crash of the aircraft. However, the NTSB noted that Radloff's hand was forced by a mechanical failure that made it impossible to lift the nose of the aircraft, and had gone completely unnoticed before the aborted launch. The various descriptions in the NTSB report become more appalling as the distance increases, but I want to hide under that bed:
The flight crew positioned the aircraft for take-off from runway 23L and at 1451: 12PM. The check-flyer asked the captain to start the starter role. At 1451: 55 the check-flyer was called "V1". Six seconds later (at 1452: 01) he called "Rotation", followed by 3 seconds (at 1452: 04) by "V2". At 1452: 05 clock The captain said: "Hey, what's going on?" and 3 seconds later "abort". The check-flyer said, "No, not over …" and then "… do not break over V1" and the captain said, "It did not fly."
Radloff, who was tearing down the runway at airspeed, tried to "turn" the plane to take off, but the nose did not lift because "lift" was called. "It had been held up by strong, gusty winds while that Airplane was parked next to an airport hangar for two days. The NTSB report includes a section on "rejected launch procedures and guidelines" taken from the Aircraft Operations Manual, stating, in particular, that "high speed declines that have been rejected many times have produced far more negative or catastrophic results than likely." If the launches had continued. "The NTSB investigators terribly stated that the conditions under which the aircraft became flightless before the time Radloff realized that the aircraft was" not flying "could not be detected in earlier protocols, the point of no return End of the runway and a chain link fence in sight.
But that's not all! In this case, Radloff – the captain of the flight – was actually trained by the "check-flyer" on this plane, a condition that, according to NTSB, made the check-flyer the "responsible pilot" of the flight. The check-aviator, a man named Andreas Gruseus, was therefore at least theoretically empowered to override any decision by Radloff that endangered the flight. In fact, Gruseus resorted to the controls when Radloff in the transcript above, about the time when Gruseus said "No, not about it", called for a crash, but he made the decision in seconds, potentially life-threatening, to succeed the rival the demolition decision. Could have been very bad!
If the defender simply responded and took control of the plane after the captain refused, the results could have been catastrophic if deceleration were further delayed (at best) to attempt to continue the departure in a flightless aircraft. The NTSB therefore concludes that disciplined airline operations [standard operating procedures] after the captain requested a declined take-off would prevent further damage to the aircraft and reduce the risk of serious or fatal injury to the crew and passengers.
The NTSB report is 134 pages long, and much of it is very technical and includes things like math, physics, and several legends of abbreviations, as well as a dry and long log of recorder data. But the pieces that are understandable to a layman are really gripping and indefinitely explain how close the Michigan men's basketball team came to a real disaster. Instead, they evacuated the grounded plane, flew off the following day and won a basketball tournament. Here is the report, if you are interested.